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FRAUD ON THE MARKET GETS A MINITRIAL:
EISEN THROUGH IN RE IPO
PATRICIA GROOT†
ABSTRACT
Securities class actions involve contested pretrial hearings to
determine the proper class of plaintiffs. The certification decision
often affects the outcome of a case because defendants usually settle if
the class is certified, whereas plaintiffs usually abandon the case
without trial if certification is denied. Courts disagree, however, over
the appropriate class certification procedure. Courts that emphasize
efficiency invoke Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin to preclude
considering substantive issues during the pretrial hearing. Courts that
emphasize the importance of determining the correct class during the
pretrial stage follow General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v.
Falcon and allow parties to introduce evidence going to the merits of
the case. Certification procedures based on Eisen or Falcon often
appear in securities class actions, which litigants usually bring under
Rule 10b-5 and base on the fraud-on-the-market theory. Eisen’s and
Falcon’s holdings influence securities class actions because courts rely
on them to determine the proper class certification procedure. This
Note argues that the apparent tension between the two cases has
provided courts with the flexibility to consider just the right amount of
evidence during class certification proceedings, permitting them to
efficiently certify the proper class.

INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1980s, opposing attorneys have used Eisen v.
1
Carlisle & Jacquelin and General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v.
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1. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).

GROOT IN FINAL2.DOC

1144

3/16/2009 3:25:37 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1143

2

Falcon to battle over the proper class certification process in
securities class action lawsuits. In one corner, Eisen focuses on the
interest of efficiency, holding that courts should not use a certification
determination as a pretext for disposing of a plaintiff’s claim on the
3
merits. Courts following this approach do not consider substantive
issues at the certification stage and instead resolve these issues only
4
after full discovery. In the other corner, in Falcon, the Supreme
Court emphasized the important effect the class certification decision
could have on the outcome of a case and held that courts may go
beyond the pleadings and consider relevant evidence on the merits
5
during class certification proceedings. Courts following this approach
6
may examine all facts relevant to a class certification decision. Under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
guidelines for class actions, courts must certify classes of plaintiffs
7
seeking to file a class action lawsuit. Eisen and Falcon greatly impact
securities class actions because courts use these contrasting holdings
to determine the proper class certification procedure. Given that
parties normally either settle class actions if the class is certified or
abandon the case without trial if class certification is denied, how
8
courts decide certification often determines the case’s outcome. A
court’s approach to class certification, therefore, has a significant
economic impact; the average class action settlement in 2007 was over
9
$33 million.
2. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
3. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177, 185.
4. See id. at 177 (“We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a
court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”); see also, e.g., In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] motion for class
certification is not an occasion for examination of the merits of the case.” (quoting Caridad v.
Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir. 1999))).
5. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160 (“[T]he class determination generally involves
considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause
of action.” (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978))).
6. Id.; see also, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154,
167–69 (3d Cir. 2001) (following this approach).
7. See infra note 28.
8. See, e.g., Newton, 259 F.3d at 164 (suggesting that a certification denial can end the case
and a successful certification can coerce settlement). But see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to
Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1357 (2003) (rebutting the
assertion that “class actions force defendants into ‘blackmail settlements’” (quoting Henry
Friendly, C.J., United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit)).
9. STEPHANIE PLANCICH, BRIAN SAXTON & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECON.
CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS: FILINGS RETURN TO 2005
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In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation provides a
good example of class determination and its potential effect on the
outcome of a case. In that case, merchants and trade associations
accused Visa and MasterCard of conspiring to monopolize the debit11
card market and charge excessive fees. The Second Circuit followed
12
Eisen and certified a class consisting of “all persons and business
13
entities who have accepted Visa and/or MasterCard credit cards”
without allowing the parties to introduce evidence relating to the
14
merits of the case during the class certification proceeding. The
dissent’s warning that a possibly erroneous certification order may
15
“coerce settlement” was consistent with the final result in this case,
16
as the defendants settled before a verdict after the circuit court
17
affirmed in favor of certification. The Third Circuit later took an
approach similar to Falcon’s, holding that “[i]n reviewing a motion
for class certification, a preliminary inquiry into the merits is
sometimes necessary to determine whether the alleged claims can be
18
properly resolved as a class action.” Despite court uncertainty over
the proper scope of review when certifying class actions, this Note
argues that the conflicting approaches the Supreme Court has
endorsed coexist usefully and provide lower courts with the flexibility
they need to balance judicial economy against fully developing
disputed issues.
The divergence in class certification often appears in class actions
involving securities fraud, which litigants usually bring under Rule
10b-5 and base on the fraud-on-the-market theory. Rule 10b-5
prohibits any fraudulent statement or omission in connection with the

LEVELS AS SUBPRIME CASES TAKE OFF; AVERAGE SETTLEMENTS HIT NEW HIGH 9 (2007),
available at http://www.nera.com/image/BRO_Recent_Trends_12-07_web_3_FINAL.pdf.
10. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001).
11. Id. at 129–31.
12. Id. at 133.
13. Id. at 131 (quoting the plaintiffs’ motion).
14. Id. at 135.
15. Id. at 148 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“Rule 23(f) was adopted in part to alleviate the
danger that an erroneous ‘order granting certification’ may force a defendant ‘to settle rather
than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of ruinous liability.’” (quoting
FED R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note)).
16. Robert B. McCaw & Robert W. Trenchard, Bring in the Experts, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 20,
2007, at S4.
17. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d at 145.
18. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 168 (3d Cir. 2001).
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19

purchase or sale of any security and remains one of the broadest
20
bases for bringing an action alleging fraud in a securities transaction.
The fraud-on-the-market theory facilitates Rule 10b-5 class actions by
stating that individual plaintiffs need not be personally aware of the
21
defendant’s fraudulent statements or omissions.
This Note explores how courts resolve conflicting interests that
arise when deciding whether to grant certification of a class asserting
claims under Rule 10b-5. Part I discusses Eisen and Falcon’s differing
approaches to class certification under Rule 23 and the fraud-on-themarket theory, which has given rise to cases that have enunciated the
Eisen-Falcon tension. Part II shows how the evolution of Rule 10b-5
class action litigation has affected class certification. As Rule 10b-5
cases have increasingly involved complex market efficiency analyses
and required more expert testimony, judges have enjoyed greater
discretion to decide what evidence to consider during class
certification. Part III looks in detail at securities class actions that
have been decided since the enactment of the Private Securities
22
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), focusing on the synthesis
of Eisen and Falcon achieved in In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities
23
24
Litigation and In re Initial Public Offerings Securities Litigation.
Part IV concludes that the apparent tension between the two lines of
cases has served as an important resource for courts, providing

19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). Courts have recognized a private remedy for violating
Rule 10b-5. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). This private litigation is “‘a most effective weapon
in the enforcement’ of the securities laws and . . . ‘a necessary supplement to Commission
action.’” Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (quoting J.I.
Chase Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
20. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7 (1971) (stating
that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of
fraud, or present a unique form of deception” (quoting A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d
393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967))). Following the enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), these provisions may be the sole means for investors redressing
their injuries through a class action. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit,
126 S. Ct. 1503, 1507 (2006) (interpreting statutory federal preemption of state law securities
claims broadly).
21. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42, 250 (1988).
22. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
23. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
24. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
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flexibility for deciding issues in securities class actions that a simple,
bright-line rule could not have resolved.
I. THE EISEN-FALCON FRAMEWORK AND FRAUD ON THE MARKET
The holdings in Eisen and Falcon play an important role in
securities class actions because courts rely on them for guidance when
determining the proper class certification procedure. This Part
describes Rule 23’s class certification procedures under Eisen’s and
Falcon’s differing interpretations. These differences are most evident
in class actions involving the fraud-on-the-market theory, which was
25
developed in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. This Part explores the rise of
the fraud-on-the-market theory in securities class actions and reviews
how courts apply Eisen and Falcon to these cases.
A. Class Certification Procedures under Eisen and Falcon
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits multiple
plaintiffs to “aggregate their claims in a manner that makes litigation
26
cost-beneficial.” Rule 23 is a specialized area of federal procedure
that involves a number of unique, overlapping, and sometimes
conflicting rules and judicial doctrines. For a case to proceed as a
27
class action, the court must certify “at an early practicable time” that
28
the class meets the requirements of Rule 23. Therefore, courts must
25. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 229, 241–49 (1988).
26. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class
Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 75 (2007).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
28. Id. To certify a class of plaintiffs, Rule 23 requires that
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id. 23(a). In addition, at least one of three additional conditions in Rule 23(b)(1) through (3)
must be met. Parties seeking certification must show either that (1) adjudicating individual
actions might create inconsistent standards or impair the rights of nonparties to protect their
interests, (2) injunctive relief is appropriate for the class, or (3) common questions of law or fact
predominate over questions affecting individual class members (the “predominance
requirement”) and the class action is a superior method for adjudicating the controversy (the
“superiority requirement”). Id. 23(b)(1)–(3). Rule 23(b)(3), which requires in part that common
questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting individual class members, is the
most common ground on which classes of shareholders seek certification in federal securities
cases. Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 461 (2006) (“Certification of shareholder fraud cases is almost always
sought under FRCP 23(b)(3) . . . .”). The primary remedy plaintiffs seek in securities law class
actions is often monetary damages, whereas (b)(1) and (b)(2) are intended for other purposes.
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hold class certification hearings prior to full trials on the merits. Eisen
and Falcon both interpreted Rule 23 and provided contrasting
procedures for class certification hearings.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin involved a class action alleging
antitrust and securities law violations arising from pricing practices of
29
securities brokers in odd-lot transactions. Morton Eisen charged two
brokerage firms with monopolizing odd-lot trading and charging
30
excessive fees. The brokerage firms allegedly “controlled ninetynine percent of the odd-lot business [and] illegally fixed the odd-lot
differential charged to the investing public at an excessive level in
31
violation of the federal antitrust laws.” In 1972, the trial court
determined that the plaintiff was “more than likely” to prevail and
therefore allocated 90 percent of the cost of giving notice of the
action to the approximately six million prospective class members to
32
the defendant. In 1973, the court of appeals “ordered the suit
33
dismissed as a class action.” In 1974, the Supreme Court upheld the
court of appeals, deciding that a trial court should not conduct “a
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine
34
whether it may be maintained as a class action.” This approach is
35
sometimes called the “Eisen rule.”
The Court stated two reasons for the Eisen rule. First, it found
no authority in Rule 23 for a merits inquiry at the certification stage,
stating that the inquiry would be “directly contrary to the command
of subdivision (c)(1)” that the class determination occur “[a]s soon as
36
37
practicable” after the action commences. Second, it feared that
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Subsection (b)(2) was never
intended to cover cases like the instant one where the primary claim is for damages, but it is
only applicable where the relief sought is exclusively or predominantly injunctive or
declaratory.”), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Crasto v. Estate of Kaskel, 63 F.R.D. 18, 21
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (“Numerous courts have held that class actions under the securities laws are
not appropriate for class action treatment under (b)(1).”).
29. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 159–60.
30. Id. at 160.
31. Brief of Petitioner at 8, Eisen, 417 U.S. 156 (No. 73-203), 1973 WL 172430.
32. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 168 (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 567
(S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
33. Id. at 169.
34. Id. at 177.
35. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 495 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (using the term
“Eisen rule”).
36. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178. The “as soon as practicable” requirement was introduced into
Rule 23 in 1966 to prevent a situation in which putative class members in a particular class
action would know the outcome of the case before having to choose whether to opt in. See Am.
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defendants could suffer prejudice from a preliminary proceeding that
determined a merits issue without the protections of “traditional rules
38
and procedures applicable to civil trials.” This preliminary decision
could “color the subsequent proceedings and place an unfair burden
39
on the defendant.” Therefore, Eisen aimed to maximize efficiency by
preventing courts from reaching the merits during a separate,
preliminary minitrial before the parties have developed their cases.
If applied too literally and broadly, the Eisen rule could impede
the adjudicative process. “In some cases, federal judges invoke the
rule to ignore merits-related evidence and to facilitate certification. In
other cases, judges profess fidelity to the rule while selectively
violating it in practice. The result is a patchwork of discretionary
40
decisions difficult to justify on principled grounds.” Recognizing the
importance of certification decisions, some courts have refused to
base decisions on inadequate records unless the parties have the
41
opportunity to argue the merits.
General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon definitively
rejected reaching the merits prematurely. Falcon was an employment
discrimination suit brought on behalf of a class of people who were

Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“[T]he potential for so-called ‘one-way
intervention’ [] aroused considerable criticism upon the ground that it was unfair to allow
members of a class to benefit from a favorable judgment without subjecting themselves to the
binding effect of an unfavorable one. The 1966 amendments were designed . . . to assure [sic]
that members of the class would be identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by
all subsequent orders and judgments.” (footnote omitted)).
37. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177–78.
38. Id. at 178.
39. Id.
40. Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1254 (2002).
41. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298, 1312 (4th Cir. 1978) (“An intelligent decision
on class certification requires ‘at least a preliminary exploration of the merits’ of the plaintiff’s
claim.” (quoting ARTHUR R. MILLER, AN OVERVIEW ON FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 15 (1977))). Commentators have expressed three different criticisms of
the Eisen rule. See Bone & Evans, supra note 40, at 1319 (“[A] careful examination of the costs
and benefits favors abolishing the rule and replacing it with a rigorous review of the evidence
and a preliminary evaluation of the merits at the certification stage.”); Bartlett H. McGuire, The
Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include an Assessment of the
Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 403 (1996) (“For more than two decades, the Supreme Court’s dictum in
Eisen has made it difficult for the courts to assess the merits in the course of their class action
analyses.”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 51, 87 (2004) (“The strong-form interpretation of Eisen, under which a trial court may
not conduct a reasoned inquiry into merits issues as they relate to class certification, cannot be
justified under any plausible analysis of public policy.”).
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denied promotions based on their national origin. General
Telephone hired Mariano S. Falcon through a special recruitment
43
program for minorities. Falcon accepted two promotions but refused
44
a third promotion. He later applied for a different position but was
45
denied in favor of several white employees with less seniority.
Falcon filed a claim, alleging that he was “passed over for promotion
because of his national origin and that [General Telephone’s]
46
promotion policy operated against Mexican-Americans as a class.”
In 1978, the district court certified a class of Mexican-American
47
applicants at General Telephone, and in 1980 the court of appeals
48
upheld the certification order. Reversing the certification order, the
Supreme Court in 1982 found that if the issues are not
plain enough from the pleadings to determine whether the interests
of the absent parties are fairly encompassed within the named
plaintiff’s claim . . . [it is] necessary for the court to probe behind the
pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question. . . .
[A]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains . . .
49
indispensable.

Courts could certify a class only if the “trial court is satisfied, after a
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been
50
satisfied.” Therefore, Falcon’s justification was based on ensuring
the correct outcome of the class certification decision.
Courts have managed to balance Eisen and Falcon’s two
independent demands by requiring an “[i]ntertwining of class action
51
inquiry with merits inquiry.” Courts have dealt with the advantages
and disadvantages of the Eisen rule pragmatically and flexibly.
Although they have sometimes refused to hold a “mini-trial[] into the
merits,” courts have developed class certification evidentiary
52
procedures. Courts have provided a “full opportunity to develop a
record containing all the facts pertaining to the suggested class and its
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 150 (1982).
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 160 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 161.
Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 274–75 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 275.
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54

representatives,” which can include preparation of memoranda,
55
56
57
affidavits, discovery, and hearings. Such procedures are not always
58
necessary in Rule 23 determinations; however, the failure to use one
59
60
when necessary is a reversible error. In summary, courts have
varied their application of Rule 23 depending on the facts of
particular cases.
B. Rule 10b-5 and Fraud on the Market
The Eisen-Falcon framework is especially important to cases in
which the class certification hearing is complicated and potentially
requires an inquiry into the merits of the case. Cases involving Rule
10b-5 often include these complications. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), acting under Section 10(b) of the Securities
61
Exchange Act of 1934, promulgated Rule 10b-5, which makes it
unlawful for any person “[t]o make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to

53. Int’l Woodworkers of Am. v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp., 659 F.2d 1259, 1268 (4th
Cir. 1981).
54. See Crawford v. W. Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1304 (5th Cir. 1980) (indicating that the
district court considered memoranda both parties had submitted when deciding the class
certification issue).
55. See Chateau de Ville Prods., Inc. v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 586 F.2d 962,
964 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding a three-and-a-half page affidavit inadequate).
56. Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1982); Stastny, 628 F.2d at 277
n.16 (explaining that the judge’s discovery orders can help in Rule 23 determinations); Chateau
de Ville Prods., 586 F.2d at 966 (holding that a failure to allow discovery when “substantial
factual issues relevant to certification” exist was improper).
57. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 503 F.2d 459, 461 (10th Cir. 1974).
58. See, e.g., Int’l Woodworkers of Am., 659 F.2d at 1268 (stating that trial courts do not
need to conduct a hearing to decide every class certification motion). Some opinions have
suggested that there were rules either requiring, Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 165 (5th Cir.
1977), or prohibiting, Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maint. Corp., 574 F.2d 656, 661 n.15 (2d
Cir. 1978), inquiries into certification. The better reading of Eisen and the cases that invoke its
rule, however, is that courts must require inquiries only to the extent the record for a
certification determination is inadequate.
59. See Bradford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 673 F.2d 792, 795–96 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining
that a hearing usually is necessary “when a serious question of commonality, or any other
essential element, is raised”). A court, however, could initiate such an inquiry on its own. See,
e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 n.17 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Lacking [sufficient information
to determine class certification,] the court may request the parties to supplement the pleadings
with sufficient material to allow an informed judgment . . . .”).
60. See, e.g., Chateau de Ville Prods., 586 F.2d at 966 (reversing the district court for
prematurely certifying a class action after the trial court failed to develop a sufficient
evidentiary record).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
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make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
62
which they were made, not misleading.” Although defendants can
contest any element of the 10b-5 claim, defendants most frequently
63
challenge plaintiffs’ proof of reliance. The reliance requirement
assesses the connection between the defendant’s misrepresentation or
omission and the plaintiff’s decision to buy or sell the defendant’s
64
security. Because Rule 23 requires putative class plaintiffs to prove
that potential defenses are common to all class members, defendants
can argue that, without proof that every class member personally
relied on the defendant’s statement or omission, courts should refuse
to certify proposed classes. Consequently, courts could reject nearly
all proposed securities class actions under the reliance element.
When this problem first arose, many lower federal courts
produced various formulations of the circumstances under which
courts may dispense with proof that individual investors relied on the
65
alleged misstatements or omissions in 10b-5 actions. Economists
then developed the efficient market theory to explain how
information unknown to some investors affects the prices those
66
investors pay for securities traded on securities markets. According
to this theory, securities traded on an efficient market incorporate all
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
63. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (“[Rule 10b-5’s] action’s
basic elements include: (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter, i.e., a
wrongful state of mind; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance, often
referred to . . . as ‘transaction causation[]’; (5) economic loss; and (6) ‘loss causation,’ i.e., a
causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.” (citations omitted)).
64. The Court refined the concept of reliance under Rule 10b-5 in Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In Affiliated Ute, the Court found proof of reliance
unnecessary in a Rule 10b-5 action “involving primarily a failure to disclose.” Id. at 153. The
case involved Indian tribe members who had been induced to sell shares representing interests
in tribal assets. Id. The Court found that certain employees of a bank transfer agent had a duty
of disclosure regarding matters affecting share value. Id. The tribe members were not required
to prove reliance on what might have been disclosed. Id. at 153–54. This decision produced a
great divide between omission cases, in which courts presume reliance from the materiality of
the omitted fact, and misstatement cases, in which no presumption arises. By relieving plaintiffs
of the burden of proving individual reliance, courts have allowed the element of reliance to
adapt to modern economic theories.
65. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[The] causal nexus can
be adequately established indirectly, by proof of materiality coupled with the common sense
that a stock purchaser does not ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form of artificially
inflated stock.”). A description of these developments is set forth in Jeffrey L. Oldham,
Comment, Taking “Efficient Markets” out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1004–11 (2003).
66. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 553 (1984).
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67

publicly known information into their price. In Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, the Supreme Court decided that courts should apply the
68
efficient market theory in securities cases:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in
an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s
stock is determined by the available material information regarding
the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not
69
directly rely on the misstatements.

The Court adopted a version of the theory that justifies a
70
presumption of reliance if the plaintiff shows certain factors,
71
including “that the shares were traded on an efficient market.”
The issue of reliance arose in Basic as part of the district court’s
decision to certify a class of plaintiffs under Rule 23. The plaintiffs
included shareholders who had sold their stock in the defendant
corporation during a certain period, allegedly because they relied on
prior fraudulent denials by management that the company was
72
negotiating a prospective merger. Affirming the district court’s class
certification decision, the Court agreed with the district court’s
assessment that the presumption of reliance provided a “practical

67. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1079 (1990) (arguing that
the Supreme Court in Basic adopted the “all publicly known information” form of the fraud-onthe-market theory).
68. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“Indeed, nearly every court that has
considered the proposition has concluded that where materially misleading statements have
been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of
individual plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be presumed.”).
69. Id. at 241–42 (omission in original) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir.
1986)).
70. Id. at 250. The presumption is rebuttable. Id.
71. Id. at 248 n.27. The Court quoted the Sixth Circuit opinion’s assertion that, to secure
the benefit of the presumption, the plaintiff must both allege and prove
(1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) that the
misrepresentations were material; (3) that the shares were traded on an efficient
market; (4) that the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to
misjudge the value of the shares; and (5) that the plaintiff traded the shares between
the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was revealed.
Id. (quoting Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, 485
U.S. 224 (1988)). As this quotation suggests, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving these
elements, consistent with the usual burden of proof in class certification matters. See
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 503 F.2d 459, 463 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating that the
party requesting a class action must show that Rule 23 requirements are satisfied).
72. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228.
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resolution to the problem of balancing the substantive requirement of
proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural requisites
73
of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.”
Basic shows how proving reliance for a Rule 10b-5 claim and
concurrently satisfying the various certification issues under Rule
74
23(b)(3) present problems for plaintiffs. The district court noted
that, if each member of the class had to prove reliance separately,
75
“individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones.”
This outcome, with many shareholders suffering losses too small to
justify an individual suit but large enough in the aggregate for a group
76
effort, would have created a “loophole” in the class action remedy.
In light of this concern, the Court’s decision to adopt the fraud-onthe-market theory, permitting a common proof of reliance to satisfy
77
the predominance requirement, amounted to a “policy decision to
promote the deterrence effect of private rights of action under the
78
securities laws.”
The Supreme Court’s adoption of the fraud-on-the-market
theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson removed a significant barrier to Rule
10b-5 class actions. Yet the opinion is not an unqualified endorsement
of expanded access to federal remedies. The Court seemed content
that lower courts would sort out substantive and procedural issues—
including what proof plaintiffs must show to invoke the theory and
whether Eisen limits the need to submit those proofs at the
certification stage—on an ad hoc basis, even if the Court’s lack of
guidance permitted courts to turn away a substantial number of
claims. Thus, the fundamental policy underlying Basic may be
characterized as one favoring judicial flexibility and the exercise of

73. Id. at 242 (alteration in original).
74. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“In order to meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must establish
that ‘the issues in the class action that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to
the class as a whole, . . . predominate over those issues that are subject only to individualized
proof.’” (omission in original) (quoting Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228,
1233 (11th Cir. 2000))).
75. Basic, 485 U.S. at 242.
76. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 28, at 457; see also Priest v. Zayre Corp., 118 F.R.D. 552,
553–54 (D. Mass. 1988) (“Courts have expressed a general preference for class certification in
securities fraud cases, based on a policy favoring enforcement of the federal securities laws, and
recognition of the fact that class actions may be the only practicable means of enforcing
investors’ rights.” (citations omitted)).
77. Basic, 485 U.S. at 242.
78. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 28, at 458.
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sound discretion. The Supreme Court was likely aware of the many
post-Eisen, pre-Basic lower court decisions applying the Eisen rule in
a spirit of procedural pragmatism and flexibility. The Court likely
expected that future trial courts would sometimes look at the case’s
merits when making certification decisions in fraud-on-the-market
cases, as discussed in the following Part.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CLASS CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE
SINCE BASIC
Basic increased lower courts’ confusion over how much evidence
to consider during class certification hearings. Because Basic did not
explain how courts should evaluate plaintiffs’ proof of fraud on the
market, many courts have permitted a variety of evidence during
certification hearings, often in the form of expert testimony and
relevant market data. But courts have had to decide how to evaluate
this evidence in light of Eisen’s prohibition on considering the merits
of a case and Falcon’s encouragement of rigorous Rule 23
certification hearings.
This Part describes two events that have eroded the Eisen rule.
First, amendments to Rule 23 appear to promote more litigation
during class certification hearings. Second, the number of issues and
the complexity of evidence needed to address those issues have
progressively increased, leading courts to increasingly allow parties to
introduce and challenge expert testimony. These changes stressed the
Eisen rule, but courts have used Falcon to adjust to these pressures
and to effectively give pretrial certification decisions greater
prominence in Rule 10b-5 actions. Two further factors, however, have
restrained Falcon’s applicability to prevent it from replacing the Eisen
rule: Congress enacted legislation that placed burdens on class action
plaintiffs, and the Supreme Court set tighter standards regarding the
use of expert witnesses.
Two events have favored Falcon over Eisen, swinging the
pendulum toward elaborate certification hearings. First, two
amendments to Rule 23 invited courts to permit greater litigation
79
during class certification hearings. In 2003, the provision that class
80
certification “may be conditional” was removed. Without language
permitting conditional class certification, courts cannot later modify

79. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 39 (2d Cir. 2006).
80. Id.
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classes after certifying them, and so courts must be satisfied during
hearings that they are certifying the right class. Additionally, the
provision that courts should make class certification decisions “as
soon as practicable” was replaced with a provision requiring the
81
decision “at an early practicable time.” By providing courts some
latitude when scheduling certification decisions, the amended rule
potentially gives the parties more time to develop relevant evidence.
Together, these amendments encourage greater litigation over class
certification—putative class plaintiffs must be more persuasive when
arguing that certification is proper, and courts may delay certification
82
decisions to wait for more evidence.
Second, the evidence necessary to prove the elements of Rule
10b-5 has become increasingly complex. The Supreme Court in Basic
did not prescribe any single methodology for determining whether a
market was efficient to invoke the fraud-on-the-market
83
84
presumption. Lower federal courts, fed by insights from academics,
85
have endorsed a variety of ways to determine market efficiency,
sometimes through excursions into economic theory or expansive
86
factual inquiries that went far beyond what sufficed in Basic. Thus,
although Basic allowed a party to simply identify the market in which
87
a stock traded as a sufficient basis for finding market efficiency,

81. Id.
82. See id. (“Two changes arguably combine to permit a more extensive inquiry into
whether Rule 23 requirements are met than was previously appropriate.”).
83. See Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[Basic] offers
little guidance for determining whether a market is efficient.”).
84. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 912 (1989) (listing, as factors to determine a security’s
market efficiency, whether the security is listed on a national exchange, whether it is actively
traded, whether it is followed by market professionals, and whether the speed of its price adjusts
to new information).
85. See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1120 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Basic essentially
allows each of the circuits room to develop its own fraud-on-the-market rules.”), vacated on
other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
86. The dissent in Basic had warned of complications, fearing that, “with no staff
economists, no experts schooled in the ‘efficient-capital-market hypothesis,’ [and] no ability to
test the validity of empirical market studies, we are not well equipped to embrace novel
constructions of a statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory.” Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 247, 246–47 (majority opinion) (“An investor who buys or sells stock at the
price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly
available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material
misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”); 4 ALAN
R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD

GROOT IN FINAL2.DOC

2009]

3/16/2009 3:25:37 PM

FRAUD ON THE MARKET

1157

more often courts went further to consider multiple conditions
believed to exist in efficient markets, some even considering
quantitative measurements as to how the stock in question traded on
88
that market. Cammer v. Bloom adopted a widely accepted five-part
test for market efficiency that measures weekly trading volume, the
number of securities analysts following the stock, the number of
market makers in the stock, the company’s eligibility to file an S-3
registration statement, and the stock’s record of quick price responses
89
to events. The complexity of the evidence has increased the need for
hearings to develop the evidence necessary to make these
determinations, which has prompted litigants to use experts to resolve
complicated financial issues and to challenge submitted statistical
90
evidence. The Cammer factors are factual assertions that plaintiffs
must prove in each case and thus pose a challenge if plaintiffs are to
adhere to Eisen’s prohibition of inquiries into the merits of the case.
Two separate factors have restrained Falcon’s applicability to
maintain a balance between Eisen and Falcon. First, Congress
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
91
(PSLRA). Remedies under Rule 10b-5 that are too readily available
92
pose a danger to securities markets. When plaintiffs can easily
obtain a remedy, the probability that defendants must pay damages
increases. Unwilling to accept even a small risk of paying the
enormous damages plaintiffs often claim, companies are forced to
settle securities claims before trial for amounts disproportionate to

§ 7:484 (2d ed. 2006) (“We think that, at a minimum, there should be a presumption—probably
conditional for class determination—that certain markets are developed and efficient for
virtually all the securities traded there: the New York and American Stock Exchanges, the
Chicago Board Options Exchange and the NASDAQ National Market System.”). But see In re
Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130, 138 (D.N.J. 1984) (“The trading on the over-thecounter market may not constitute an ‘active and substantial’ market necessary to apply the
fraud-on-the-market theory.”), rev’d on other grounds, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988).
88. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
89. Id. at 1285–87.
90. See infra notes 112–24; see also 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 87, § 7:484
(“It is important to have a fairly simple way of resolving—at least tentatively—at an early stage
in a case whether the market for a particular security is open, developed and efficient, since this
affects whether a claim has been stated and whether a class may be certified. . . . [S]ome sort of
evidentiary base is appropriate for class determination.”).
91. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
92. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring) (stating that expanding such remedies “will lead to large judgments, payable in the
last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers”).
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93

their merit. In the years following Basic, skepticism toward the
legitimacy of securities law claims was directed particularly at class
94
actions. These perceptions led to the enactment of the PSLRA,
which placed additional burdens on plaintiffs seeking recovery under
95
Rule 10b-5, some of which were specifically directed at class actions.
Although the PSLRA did not specifically address procedures relating
96
court procedures eventually reflected
to class certification,
skepticism regarding class actions that motivated the statute’s
passage. Courts both invoked a narrow reading of Eisen and cited the
PSLRA as authority for denying certification even when no express
97
provision of the act compelled the denial.
Second, courts have imposed more stringent restrictions on the
use of expert witnesses. The factual inquiries in certification hearings
98
for Rule 10b-5 cases often require the testimony of expert witnesses.
Courts exercise a role as “gatekeeper” with respect to expert
99
100
evidence. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the
93. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975); see also In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (asserting that defendants cannot
“stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial”).
94. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31, 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730, 736 (criticizing “manipulation by class action lawyers” and “frivolous
securities class actions”).
95. E.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101, 109 Stat. at 737–49 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–4, 77z–1 (2006)); see also, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(6) (limiting
class plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees to a “reasonable percentage” of recoveries).
96. Given the boost that the fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic gave to class certification,
it would not have been surprising if Congress had responded by legislatively reversing the
theory. Basic marked the beginning of a period in which the filing rate of class actions tripled.
Dunbar & Heller, supra note 28, at 529. An earlier version of the PSLRA would have reversed
the fraud-on-the-market theory, but the SEC Chairman testified against this version. See
Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
Finance of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 203 (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
testimony/testarchive/1995/spch025.txt (“An actual reliance requirement of the type proposed
would also make it virtually impossible for investors to assert their claims as part of a class
action.”).
97. See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267–68
(5th Cir. 2007) (citing both Eisen and the PSLRA when denying a class certification).
98. Absent Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, expert testimony, usually an opinion
based on facts the expert has no first-hand knowledge of, would run afoul of the common law
rule excluding hearsay evidence. See Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The
Use of Special Masters, 43 EMORY L.J. 927, 938 (1994) (stating that hearsay evidence is
“evidence not directly perceived by the senses of the person giving the testimony”).
99. See Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence,
110 HARV. L. REV. 941, 944 (1997) (noting that without a judicial check requiring consideration
of contrary opinion, expert testimony could amount to “junk science”). Daubert requires judges
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Supreme Court set ground rules for courts’ gatekeeper role,
permitting a federal court to admit expert witness testimony only if it
determines that the testimony consists of “(1) scientific knowledge
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
101
issue.” The Daubert standard makes it easier for courts to reject
102
expert testimony they deem unreliable. These standards force
parties to litigate the quality of their experts before the experts can
testify. Certification decisions should have the benefit of Daubert
analysis to “eliminate both unreliable evidence and unsubstantiated
103
class actions.”
The Eisen rule generally limits review of the merits of the case
before certification of the class. Courts swung the pendulum from
Eisen to Falcon by allowing complex evidence and expert witnesses
during class certification hearings. Courts then restrained their
application of Falcon, however, to find a balance between Eisen and
Falcon. The Eisen-Falcon framework has proven sufficiently flexible

to ensure that “an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the
task at hand.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). Daubert
interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which states that
[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
100. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
101. Id. at 592. The Court then set forth a nonexclusive list of factors that a court might
consider when deciding whether to admit expert testimony, such as whether the expert theory
or technique is subject to peer review and what its potential rate of error might be. Id. at 593–94.
In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Court articulated the court’s
role in terms of a “gatekeeping” function applicable to all expert testimony, not just that
relating to scientific knowledge. Id. at 141.
102. See KENNETH S. BROUN, ROBERT P. MOSTELLER & PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EVIDENCE:
CASES AND MATERIALS 591 (7th ed. 2007) (“A Rand Institute study of civil cases concluded
that since Daubert, judges have examined the reliability of expert evidence more closely and
have found more evidence unreliable as a result.”). But see id. (“In contrast, admissibility
standards in criminal litigation appear unchanged.”).
103. L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Note, Between “Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using
Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1041, 1088 (2004); see also Mandi L. Williams, Note, The History of Daubert and Its Effect on
Toxic Tort Class Action Certification, 22 REV. LITIG. 181, 208 (2003) (“A Daubert inquiry
should be allowed in class action certification proceedings.”). The Supreme Court has rejected
the argument that pretrial gatekeeping judicial determinations such as Daubert inquiries violate
the Seventh Amendment. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2512 n.8
(2007).
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to both accommodate increased evidentiary burdens during
certification hearings and allow courts to carefully screen cases before
certifying a 10b-5 class action, as the next Part shows.
III. APPLYING THE EISEN-FALCON FRAMEWORK AFTER THE
PSLRA
Courts have increasingly insisted on a greater amount of proof
regarding efficiency for the relevant security’s market before
certifying a securities class action claim based on the fraud-on-themarket theory. The quality of certification decisions that involve
increasingly sophisticated economic theory can only improve if
parties can explain and challenge the evidence of fraud on the
market. Responding to this reality, lower courts have developed,
through a case-by-case process, a pretrial certification procedure that
conflicts with Eisen. As Part IV argues, Eisen and Falcon allow for
this case-by-case balancing. This Part discusses the decisions in In re
PolyMedica and In re Initial Public Offerings, which illustrate how the
balancing process works.
A. Securities Cases through In re PolyMedica
In the wake of PSLRA’s enactment, courts have applied the
Eisen-Falcon framework in various ways that increase procedural
demands when deciding certification issues in Rule 10b-5 actions but
that are difficult to explain through any single principle. Cases can be
grouped into three categories: (1) those that apply Eisen and limit
inquiries, (2) those that apply Falcon and permit broad inquiries, and
104
(3) those that adopt a mixed approach. Courts still sometimes cite
the Eisen rule as curtailing factual inquiries in challenges to
105
certification motions in Rule 10b-5 cases. More often, courts take a
mixed approach to applying the Eisen rule by incorporating the
Falcon holding in view of the complexities of proving market

104. See Miller, supra note 41, at 55–61 (analyzing various class action proceedings in terms
of “strong-form” and “weak-form” applications of the Eisen rule).
105. See, e.g., Lehocky v. Tidel Techs., Inc., 220 F.R.D. 491, 498 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (citing
Eisen for the proposition that courts assume the allegations in a complaint are true for purposes
of a class certification motion). Yet the court had actually conducted a hearing on market
efficiency at which both sides submitted expert testimony and performed “sophisticated
statistical tests,” id. at 506, and the court evaluated the evidence under Cammer standards, id. at
505–09. Thus the curtailment effectively operated only to exclude the defendants’ offer of
rebuttal evidence, which the court said was a matter for trial. Id. at 505 n.16.
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efficiency and other elements of fraud on the market. O’Neil v.
106
Appel illustrates this mixed approach. The O’Neil opinion suggested
that Basic modified Eisen, at least to the extent necessary to permit
107
procedures for adequately considering fraud-on-the-market issues.
108
The court’s consideration involved conducting a hearing during
109
which the court tested the evidence against the Cammer standards
110
to determine whether market efficiency had been shown. The court
recognized Eisen as a limit but did not hesitate to consider any
111
substantive merits issues intertwined with the certification decision.
At the other end of the spectrum, some courts allow significantly
more factfinding to determine market efficiency. In Krogman v.
112
Sterritt, for instance, the court invited dueling experts to prove
113
whether the relevant market was efficient. In Krogman, investors
114
sought to certify a class in a securities fraud action. The investors’
expert testified that the average weekly turnover of the company’s
stock was high enough to create a presumption that the market was
115
efficient. The company’s expert testified that the investors’ expert’s
calculations were incorrect and that the stock was not actively
116
traded. The court agreed with the company’s expert that “the
presumption of market efficiency, which would support an
117
application of fraud on the market theory, [did] not apply.” The
court denied certification because each investor would have had to

106. O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
107. Id. at 497 (“By adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Basic court implied,
though perhaps unintentionally, that the district courts must examine some of the merits.”
(quoting In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1994))).
108. Id. at 494.
109. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
110. O’Neil, 165 F.R.D. at 500–01.
111. See id. at 500 (stating that “the court is not required at this point to decide the merits of
plaintiffs’ fraud-on-the-market theory,” but “[o]n the basis of the evidence now of record, . . .
plaintiffs have virtually no chance of succeeding on this theory”).
112. Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
113. Id. at 474 (“[T]his Court must decide whether Plaintiffs have proven that the OTCBB
market was efficient.”); see also Serfaty v. Int’l Automated Sys., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 418, 421 (D.
Utah 1998) (“[T]he determinative question now becomes whether IAS stock traded in an
efficient market . . . .”).
114. Krogman, 202 F.R.D. at 470–71.
115. Id. at 474.
116. Id. at 474–75.
117. Id. at 475, 478.
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prove individual reliance and therefore failed to meet the
118
predominance requirement of Rule 23.
119
Additionally, in cases such as Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc.,
the court invited full Daubert challenges to expert testimony and
120
excluded experts’ opinions based on Daubert considerations. In
Ascendant Solutions, investors sought to certify a class in a securities
121
fraud action. The investors proffered an expert to prove the
company’s securities traded on an efficient market, and the company
122
The court applied
sought to exclude the expert’s testimony.
Daubert, found the expert’s testimony unreliable, and granted the
123
company’s motion to strike the testimony. Each investor would
have to prove individual reliance, so the court denied certification
because the investors failed to meet the predominance requirement
124
of Rule 23. In circuits that had not yet specified procedures for
certification hearings, the time was ripe for defendants to challenge
125
the omission of these procedures.
In the First Circuit, defendants in In re PolyMedica challenged
126
the district court’s class certification procedures. The district court
had accepted the defendants’ argument that a “more searching
127
inquiry” was appropriate in deciding class certification issues, thus
rejecting a narrow reading of the Eisen rule and aligning this court
with a majority of other federal circuits. Nevertheless, the district
118. Id. at 478.
119. Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV0166N, 2004 WL 1490009 (N.D.
Tex. July 1, 2004) (mem.).
120. See, e.g., Bell v. Fore Sys., Inc., No. Civ.A. 97-1265, 2002 WL 32097540, at *1, *4 (W.D.
Pa. Aug. 2, 2002) (mem.) (granting the defendants’ motion to strike the testimony of the
plaintiffs’ expert on Daubert grounds); Ascendant Solutions, 2004 WL 1490009, at *3–4 (same);
see also Miller, supra note 41, at 63 (“The fraud-on-the-market presumption in Basic cannot be
intelligently administered without at least a preliminary look at the merits-related issue of
whether the relevant market is efficient.”).
121. Ascendant Solutions, 2004 WL 1490009, at *1.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *4.
124. Id. at *5.
125. Prior to the circuit court decision in In re PolyMedica, the First and Second Circuits
were among those that did not provide for a full pretrial hearing of individual reliance evidence.
See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating
that a certification proponent need only show that Rule 23 requirements were met “based on
methodology that was not fatally flawed”); In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 224 F.R.D. 27, 34
(D. Mass. 2004) (“The First Circuit has not addressed the issue [of the level of inquiry for class
certification] squarely . . . .”), vacated and remanded, 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
126. In re PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 4.
127. In re PolyMedica, 224 F.R.D. at 34.
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court rejected the defendants’ further argument that courts should
determine whether a market is efficient using a widely accepted,
economics-based standard that prices must reflect “all,” rather than
128
“most,” publicly available material information. The plaintiffs’
expert relied on the five Cammer factors and testified that the
129
relevant market was efficient. The defendants’ expert relied on
three factors not enumerated in Cammer and testified that the
130
relevant market was not efficient. The district court found the
plaintiffs’ expert witness testimony that the stock price in question
reflected “most” publicly available information was sufficient and
ordered certification even though the defendants provided evidence
131
that the price did not reflect “all” publicly available information. On
appeal, the First Circuit held that the district court improperly
determined that market efficiency must reflect “all” such
132
information. It therefore vacated the lower court’s order and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
133
opinion. At the same time that the First Circuit required this higher
standard of proof, it also accepted the mixed reading of the EisenFalcon framework that the lower court had adopted to permit
considering evidence relevant to whether the higher standard of proof
134
was met. The First Circuit held that “the district court must evaluate
the plaintiff’s evidence . . . critically without allowing the defendant to
turn the class-certification proceeding into an unwieldy trial on the
135
merits.”
The First Circuit’s friendliness to merits-related
investigations permitted the district court to weigh competing
136
evidence, including expert testimony regarding the Cammer factors.
The First Circuit then found that the district court was not permissive
enough because the district court had rejected the defendant’s

128. Id. at 41.
129. In re PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 4.
130. Id.
131. In re PolyMedica, 224 F.R.D. at 43.
132. In re PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 13–14.
133. Id. at 19. The court rejected an even higher standard of “fundamental value efficiency”
that would have required showing not only that the price reflects such information but also that
it is accurate. Id. at 16.
134. Id. at 6.
135. Id. at 17. The court’s emphasis suggests that the First Circuit thought the scope of the
trial court’s consideration of the merits was unacceptable rather than the fact that the trial court
had reached the merits at all.
136. Id. at 4–5.
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additional evidence regarding factors beyond those enumerated in
137
Cammer.
The First Circuit acknowledged that abandoning a narrow
reading of Eisen presents practical difficulties. It recognized that
without a bright-line rule, defendants would always press the court to
138
require more, and plaintiffs to require less, evidence of efficiency.
The First Circuit directed trial courts to keep these demands in
139
balance through “broad discretion.”
Although the First Circuit’s guidance may seem overly general,
on remand it inspired a better-focused rehearing by the trial court.
The district court applied Daubert standards to its evaluation of the
plaintiff’s expert testimony, found the testimony was only marginally
140
persuasive, and admitted the evidence that it had previously
141
This evidence proved relevant to the standard of
rejected.
“information efficiency” and to conclusively showing that it was not
142
met.
B. The Second Circuit Joins the Party in In re IPO
Shortly after In re PolyMedica was decided, the Second Circuit
had a similar opportunity to rethink the Eisen issues in In re Initial
143
Public Offerings (IPO) Securities Litigation. The In re IPO plaintiffs
alleged “a vast scheme to defraud the investing public,” bringing
claims under Rule 10b-5 and other securities laws against fifty-five
144
underwriters, 310 issuers, and hundreds of associated individuals.
The defendants’ alleged scheme involved wrongfully requiring
purchasers of securities in initial public offerings to commit to paying

137. Id. at 19. The rejected evidence included an expert report based in part on results of a
“serial correlation test” and a “put-call parity test” that tended to show constraints on the ability
of short sellers to trade on information relating to the stock in question. Id. at 18 n.21. This
evidence, in turn, would have tended to show a limitation on the ability of market participants
to exploit profit opportunities and would thus arguably have been inconsistent with the “all”
information standard of market efficiency. Id.
138. Id. at 17.
139. Id.
140. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 270 (D. Mass. 2006).
141. Id. at 272–79.
142. Id.
143. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
144. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 293, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(“[T]he motions to dismiss are, for the most part, denied.”).
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additional forms of compensation, such as purchasing additional
145
shares in the aftermarket.
After having previously denied a substantial portion of the
146
defendants’ motion to dismiss the various claims, District Judge
147
Scheindlin considered the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.
148
submitting
The defendants vigorously opposed this motion,
“thousands of pages of briefs, affidavits, exhibits and reports in
149
opposition to the motion.” Judge Scheindlin was able to find in the
record three items that were probative on the question of market
efficiency: (1) the stock in question was to be traded on the
NASDAQ National Market, (2) it was traded at high volumes, and
150
(3) coverage by analysts and in the media was substantial.
151
Notwithstanding the subsequent amendments to Rule 23, Judge
Scheindlin invoked the mixed approach toward the Eisen-Falcon
framework and deferred definitive proof of certification issues until
152
trial. Although she acknowledged the arguable relevance of broader
153
tests of efficiency, Judge Scheindlin nevertheless concluded that the
154
three items were sufficient under the “some showing” standard
155
established in Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, which
156
she believed to be the evidentiary standard at the certification stage.
Judge Scheindlin therefore granted the motion for class
157
certification.

145. In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 27. The court saw the fact pattern as a
continuation of long-standing securities industry practice of generating profits by artificially
creating “hot issues markets.” In re Initial Pub. Offering, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 298–308.
146. In re Initial Pub. Offering, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 298 (“Plaintiffs have pled a coherent
scheme . . . to defraud the investing public. As such, these lawsuits may proceed.”).
147. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Six “test cases”
were selected to determine whether the suits could proceed as class actions. Id. at 70.
148. Id. at 71 (“In their zeal to defeat the motion for class certification, defendants have
launched such a broad attack that accepting their arguments would sound the death knell of
securities class actions.”).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 107.
151. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
152. In re Initial Pub. Offering, 227 F.R.D. at 107 n.325.
153. Id. at 107 & n.323 (mentioning the five Cammer factors).
154. Id. at 107. “Under any conceivable test for market efficiency, these three facts are
sufficient to meet plaintiff’s Rule 23 burden to make ‘some showing’ that the stocks in question
traded on an efficient market.” Id.
155. Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
156. Id. at 292.
157. In re Initial Pub. Offering, 227 F.R.D. at 122.
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The Second Circuit reversed the certification order and aligned
158
itself with the majority of other circuits, including the First Circuit
post-In re PolyMedica, on issues including (1) using Eisen to limit the
159
scope of class certification hearings, (2) the standard of proof in
160
class certification motions, and (3) the standard for admitting expert
161
testimony in these hearings.
The Second Circuit embraced a practical reinterpretation of
Eisen for efficient market determinations that should help make these
determinations more accurate. As to the first issue, whether Eisen
limits class certification hearings, the Second Circuit undertook a
162
“careful examination” of the Eisen rule before reaching its decision.
The court focused on the possible justification for the rule that a
pretrial hearing of evidence could prejudice a defendant, but
163
ultimately dismissed the justification as “fatuous.” The court also
looked at the specific facts of Eisen, pointing out that the district
court “had not looked at the merits in order to determine whether
164
any one of the Rule 23 requirements was met.” In this light, the
court concluded that Eisen did not mean that a party could avoid
establishing a Rule 23 requirement whenever the Rule 23 issue
165
related to the merits. The court thus joined the majority of other
courts, requiring an appropriate Rule 23 determination even when
166
the Rule 23 issue overlaps with a merits issue.
The Second Circuit then addressed the standard of proof
plaintiffs must meet to prove fraud on the market during certification
hearings. The court rejected Caridad’s “some showing” standard for
167
proof in Rule 23 matters, stating that the standard was too low.

158. See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 38–39, 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2006)
(outlining the majority view, agreeing with this view, and reversing the certification order).
159. Id. at 33–34, 41.
160. Id. at 39–42.
161. Id. at 41–42.
162. Id. at 33.
163. Id. at 38 n.9.
164. Id. at 34.
165. Id. at 33.
166. Id. at 41.
167. Id. at 40. The court struggled to find a different standard. It cited without approval
decisions in other circuits that held that parties seeking certification must establish Rule 23’s
requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 29–30. The court then reexamined its
own then-recent decision in Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Communications, 435 F.3d 219 (2d Cir.
2006), which had held that, at least for 23(b)(3) predominance, preponderance was the lowest
possible standard. In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 37 & n.8.
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Instead, it concluded the proper standard was whether “discretion has
168
been exceeded (or abused),” leaving the trial judge “some leeway.”
This decision added support to the First Circuit’s holding in In re
PolyMedica, endorsing an appropriately flexible, discretionary
standard that can respond to the expanding variety of issues
169
presented by class actions. In re IPO urged, following from Eisen,
that courts should exercise this discretion to avoid “a protracted minitrial of substantial portions of the underlying litigation” but should
still use Falcon to demand enough evidence “by affidavits,
170
documents, or testimony” to satisfy each Rule 23 requirement. The
opinion balanced familiar concerns of each of these Supreme Court
precedents, indirectly endorsing extensive evidentiary proceedings
171
when considering class certification.
Continuing to apply a mixed approach to the Eisen-Falcon
framework, the Second Circuit clarified the third issue regarding the
standard for admitting expert testimony. The court held that expert
testimony was not subject only to a limited Daubert standard
172
requiring the testimony to not be “fatally flawed.” Instead, district
courts should allow “statistical dueling” of experts and “assess all of
the relevant evidence admitted at the class certification stage and
determine whether each Rule 23 requirement has been met, just as
the judge would resolve a dispute about any other threshold
173
prerequisite for continuing a lawsuit.”
Notwithstanding its tolerance for inquiries into the merits of a
case and statistical dueling of experts, the Second Circuit found that
174
this particular case required no further inquiries or experts. This
decision to close the record on efficiency could seem inconsistent with
the court’s instruction to allow expert witnesses and evidence going to
the merits of the case. Yet ordering more evidence would have been
pointless because the Second Circuit concluded that initial public
175
offerings are never an efficient market. The Court reasoned that

168. In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 40 (noting that this leeway “is not boundless”).
169. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
170. In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 41.
171. Although the court reversed her certification decision, the Second Circuit opinion
reflects no disapproval of the extensive record that was developed in Judge Scheindlin’s court as
to whether Rule 23 requirements were met.
172. In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 36 & n.7.
173. Id. at 42.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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“[t]he fraud-on-the-market ‘presumption can not logically apply when
plaintiffs allege fraud in connection with an IPO, because in an IPO
176
there is no well-developed market in offered securities.’” The court
supported its decision by stating that (1) other courts had issued
similar holdings with respect to initial public offerings, (2) SEC rules
limited analyst coverage during such offerings, and (3) the plaintiffs’
own allegations showed that the market was slow to react once the
177
truth of the fraudulent scheme became known. Therefore, the
court’s decision indicates that more evidence is not always better than
less and that courts must exercise discretion to distinguish whether
the submitted evidence meets the relevant standard.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO EMBRACE DISCRETION
Rule 23 establishes the procedures for certifying a class. Eisen
and Falcon interpreted the rule, but in contrasting ways. Eisen
interpreted the rule narrowly, precluding review of the case’s merits
before class certification; Falcon allowed wide review of the merits to
determine class certification. Analyzing the facts of the cases
presented in this Note in the context of the Eisen-Falcon continuum,
this Part asserts several ideas. First, it maintains that judicial
discretion stemming from the contrasting holdings in Eisen and
Falcon suits securities class actions. This Part demonstrates how the
holdings in Eisen and Falcon complement each other to allow just the
right amount of evidence into class certification proceedings to certify
the appropriate class efficiently. This Part concludes by contending
that the flexibility these two holdings allow is superior to the
alternatives and will likely continue to assist courts in class
certification proceedings.
Scholars have praised judicial discretion during litigation,
arguing that “judicial discretion does, in fact, lead to greater fairness
178
and equality.” These commentators have argued for using judicial
179
discretion in areas of law other than securities, including bankruptcy

176. Id. (quoting Berwecky v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 197 F.R.D. 65, 68 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
177. Id. at 42–43.
178. Rosemary Barkett, Judicial Discretion and Judicious Deliberation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 905,
907 (2007).
179. See, e.g., Lauren E. Tribble, Note, Judicial Discretion and the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention Act, 57 DUKE L.J. 789, 815 (2007) (“Congress should revise the means test to allow
judges more discretion in identifying abusive debtors.”).
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180

and criminal sentencing. Judicial discretion to use both the holdings
in Eisen and Falcon seems particularly suited to Rule 10b-5 securities
class actions. Rule 10b-5 securities class actions frequently involve the
application of the fraud-on-the-market theory, creating the need to
deal procedurally with large amounts of technical economic data in
181
certification hearings regarding market efficiency. The theory has
increased rapidly in complexity and importance since the Supreme
182
Court approved the theory in Basic.
This evolution toward
complexity may continue, if not accelerate, as courts become more
sophisticated in their understanding of the finance and thus require
183
additional proofs before accepting economics-based presumptions,
and as securities lawyers develop useful economic tools to provide
184
those proofs. Rules that govern securities class action procedures
will benefit from flexibility that allows judges to deal with these
changes without the need for detailed regulations that take every
consideration into account. Though the complexity of class action
securities cases has grown, the decisions established in Eisen and
Falcon when applied together provide a framework to adapt to the
increased complexity.
The Eisen-Falcon framework influences procedure on two levels.
The first is a prohibition against using certification as a pretext for
ruling on the general merits of the case rather than only on specific
185
certification issues. For example, a violation of this level may have
existed if the In re IPO district court had invited submission of broad
categories of evidence leading to a certification decision based on its
belief that a violation of securities laws had been shown, or equally if
the Second Circuit had based its reversal on the opposite view. The
distinction between issues going to the merits and issues regarding
certification is often hard to define, however. This framework then
operates on a second level at which courts must make difficult

180. See, e.g., Barkett, supra note 178, at 907.
181. See supra Part II.
182. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
183. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir.
2007) (holding that, in a fraud-on-the-market case, “loss causation must be established at the
class certification stage by a preponderance of all admissible evidence”).
184. See generally Linda Allen, Meeting Daubert Standards in Calculating Damages for
Shareholder Class Action Litigation, 62 BUS. LAW. 955 (2007) (proposing an economics-based
method to calculate damages for shareholder class action suits).
185. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974).
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procedural choices about how to resolve those intertwined issues
186
efficiently and fairly without violating the first-level prohibition.
Courts encounter many problems within the Eisen-Falcon
framework when they deal with the substantive issues that determine
the scope of a class. There is not a single procedure to determine how
much expert testimony is necessary to competently judge class
certification. Both sides in the suit would wish to bring as many
witnesses and as much testimony to support their arguments as
possible, swinging the pendulum toward Falcon from the judicial
economy of Eisen. But without standards of a gatekeeper function to
limit Falcon, the side with the greater resources would have an
advantage.
The courts have constructed rules that allow parties to introduce
some evidence but still limit the Falcon tendency toward considering
large amounts of evidence and remain somewhat close to Eisen. For
example, courts have used the five Cammer factors to determine
187
market efficiency. Through the Cammer factors, courts can allow
plaintiffs and defendants to introduce some evidence but can limit the
evidence only to that which is relevant to the five factors.
Additionally, courts have applied Daubert’s gatekeeper analysis when
188
deciding whether to allow expert witness testimony. By allowing
expert witness testimony only when courts deem it reliable, courts
have balanced Eisen and Falcon.
By following Eisen, courts can certify classes quickly and begin
considering the case’s merits. To ensure the certified class is correct,
however, courts must use Falcon to consider some evidence during
class certification. The continuum of Eisen to Falcon permits this
flexibility—judges can use their discretion to emphasize Falcon if they
need more information to refine the class or to emphasize Eisen to
limit that inquiry when efficiency requires.
Judges’ increasing tolerance for extensive certification hearings
has shown the Eisen rule’s adaptability to these intertwined issues;
indeed, during these proceedings, courts have found the presumed
tension between Eisen and Falcon to be more apparent than real. In
186. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (“Sometimes the
[merits and certification] issues are plain enough from the pleadings to determine whether the
interests of the absent parties are fairly encompassed within the named plaintiff’s claim, and
sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest
on the certification question.”).
187. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
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190

re PolyMedica and In re IPO show that, to the extent tension
exists, courts can resolve it. Both cases criticized precedents within
their respective circuits that gave too little weight to Falcon and
misread Eisen as directing courts to certify classes as long as the
191
pleadings were formally adequate. Instead, the cases integrated the
two Supreme Court opinions by accepting Falcon’s instruction that
courts may examine the facts underlying a certification decision while
also acknowledging Eisen by not allowing the inquiry to become a
192
pretext for courts to reject plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.
Reading Eisen and Falcon separately, the cases appear to
contradict each other. Eisen precludes review of the merits of the case
before class certification; Falcon allows wide review of the merits to
determine class certification. In practice, as subsequent court rulings
demonstrate, the holdings of these two cases create a continuum
giving courts flexibility depending on the facts of the situation.
Courts’ continued, frequent citation of the two holdings over such a
lengthy period, during which courts have often applied both cases in
evolving areas of specialized securities law, suggests Eisen and Falcon
were reasonably well designed to help courts during periods of
transition and stress. The flexibility the two decisions permit has
benefited the adjudication of class certification in securities class
actions. These class certification hearings will continue to test the
ability of judges to exercise sound discretion, but selecting one rule or
the other, or some newly substituted rule, for courts to apply on a
one-size-fits-all basis likely would not assist judges.

189. See supra notes 126–42 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part III.B.
191. See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 34 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“Unfortunately, the statement in Eisen that a court considering certification must not consider
the merits has sometimes been taken out of context and applied in cases where a merits inquiry
either concerns a Rule 23 requirement or overlaps with such a requirement.”); In re PolyMedica
Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Courts which choose to consider such
fundamental value evidence at the class-certification stage run the risk of turning the classcertification proceeding into a mini-trial on the merits, which must not happen.”).
192. See In re Initial Pub. Offerings, 471 F.3d at 41 (“[A] district court judge may certify a
class only after making determinations that each of the Rule 23 requirements has been met [but]
in making such determinations, a district judge should not assess any aspect of the merits
unrelated to a Rule 23 requirement . . . .”); In re PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 17 (“Exercising its
broad discretion, . . . the district court must evaluate the plaintiff’s evidence of efficiency
critically without allowing the defendant to turn the class-certification proceeding into an
unwieldy trial on the merits.”).
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CONCLUSION
Federal courts have undertaken a localized, circuit-by-circuit and
case-by-case effort to establish standards for determining the
sufficiency of claims invoking the fraud-on-the-market theory for
class certification. This effort has proceeded on two fronts. One
concerns the substantive question of what elements are required for a
showing of market efficiency. The other concerns procedural
questions of what standards of proof apply and when in the trial
parties bring their evidence. The substantive question has attracted
more academic attention than the procedural question. It continues to
evolve in ways that cannot be predicted with certainty, though the
fraud-on-the-market theory likely will continue to require more
complex factual investigations. Although the related procedural
question may seem of less intellectual interest, how it is resolved in a
particular case can affect the outcome as much as, if not more than,
the substantive question. Rule 23’s inherent flexibility and the
Supreme Court’s contrasting decisions in Eisen and Falcon together
give courts substantial discretion when deciding class certification—
and courts have seized that opportunity. Given the evolving nature of
the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Eisen and Falcon rules are both
necessary and appropriate to adjudicating securities class action cases.
Courts should preserve the Eisen-Falcon continuum.

